State Management of Mobilization Processes in a War of Attrition: A Comparative Analysis of the Models of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the Context of National Security
Abstract
Purpose. To identify the specific features and key managerial factors shaping the mobilization models of Ukraine and the Russian Federation under conditions of a war of attrition and to assess their significance for state strategic resilience.
Method. The study applies systems, structural-functional, and comparative approaches. The comparison is structured around five analytical dimensions: resource base, force-generation mechanisms, institutional coordination, human-resource regeneration, and cross-sectoral resilience.
Results. Mobilization is shown to function as a permanent cross-sectoral mechanism of public governance. The Ukrainian model demonstrates a tendency toward adaptive and selective management under significant demographic and resource constraints. The Russian model relies on a larger resource base, greater centralization, and extensive force regeneration through contract-based and quasi-mobilization mechanisms.
Theoretical Implications. The study advances the conceptualization of mobilization as a cyclical process of regenerating defense human resources and refines the concept of mobilization resilience.
Practical Implications. The findings provide directions for improving mobilization planning, training, rotation, reservation of critically important personnel, and assessment of the socioeconomic consequences of mobilization decisions.
Originality. A five-dimensional conceptual analytical matrix is proposed for comparing mobilization models according to managerial criteria, together with a set of indicators for subsequent empirical operationalization and validation.
Limitations. The study is constrained by asymmetries in publicly available data, uncertainty in wartime statistics, and the inability to quantitatively validate the proposed indicators.
Article type. Theoretical and analytical article; comparative study.
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References
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Copyright (c) 2026 Іван Ткач, Олександр Кононенко, Роман Войцеховський, Андрій Мельниченко, Андрій Шигида, Василь Мосолов
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