Proposals and Recommendations for Developing the State System of Cognitive Security and Cognitive Influence in the Interests of the Defence Forces of Ukraine
Abstract
Purpose. To substantiate proposals and practical recommendations for the development of the national system of cognitive security and cognitive influence in the interests of the Defence Forces of Ukraine, coordinated between the military level (the Armed Forces of Ukraine) and the state level of governance in the field of military security.
Method. The study employs systems analysis, synthesis, comparison, systematisation, formalisation, expert evaluation, prioritisation based on an integrated index (the product of the probability of implementation and the level of impact on national security), and scenario planning across different time horizons.
Findings. Six complementary proposals were identified (three at the military level and three at the state level). For each proposal, a set of implementation measures, timelines, and expected outcomes was developed. Expert evaluation of the probability of implementation (65–88%) and the level of impact on national security (78–95%) was conducted. A prioritisation matrix was developed, the proposals were ranked, and a roadmap for their implementation was prepared. The study substantiates the feasibility of simultaneously implementing rapid organisational measures and the phased implementation of institutional and legal solutions.
Theoretical implications. The findings may be used to support the formulation of state policy in the field of cognitive security, the development of the Concept of Cognitive Security and the Cognitive Resilience Strategy, the improvement of defence planning, as well as research and educational activities.
Paper type: Theoretical and methodological.
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