A Probabilistic Cost Model of Finality Verification Strategies for Proof-of-Stake Light Clients
Abstract
Purpose. To develop a probabilistic cost model for evaluating block finality verification strategies for light clients of Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains, considering cryptographic security, stake distribution, and verification costs.
Methodology. The study employs probabilistic modeling, combinatorial analysis, numerical integration, dynamic programming, and multicriteria comparison. Hypergeometric and Wallenius’ noncentral hypergeometric distributions are used to estimate the probability of a successful attack. Four strategies are examined: full signature verification, recursive cryptographic proofs, random sampling-based verification, and the native NEAR light-client protocol.
Findings. Verification security and costs depend on the number of validators, the concentration of stake, and an adversary’s ability to manipulate randomness. For a system with 100 validators and a concentrated stake distribution, deterministic verification of a minimum quorum is less costly than sampling-based verification at an attack success probability of 2⁻⁶⁴. For 1,000 validators, this advantage emerges only when the required attack success probability is lower than 2⁻⁸⁰.
Originality. The study provides an integrated comparison of finality verification strategies by combining a probabilistic attack model with computational and transaction-cost models for blockchains that use Ed25519 signatures.
Practical implications. The findings support evidence-based selection of finality verification mechanisms when designing blockchain light clients and cross-chain bridges.
Article type. Research Article.
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References
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