Ground Robotic Complexes of the Russian Federation in Modern Combat Operations: Tactical and Technical Features and Comparative Analysis
Abstract
Purpose. Comprehensive analysis of ground robotic complexes of the Russian Federation in the context of modern combat operations, in particular the war against Ukraine, with an assessment of their tactical and technical features, combat use practice, effectiveness and limitations, as well as a comparative comparison of Russian NRCs with Western and Ukrainian developments.
Method. The research is based on a combination of qualitative methods of open-source intelligence (OSINT) and comparative analysis.
Findings. The study found that the Russian ground robotic systems perform mainly auxiliary functions and are not independent strike weapons. Their effectiveness is significantly limited by the instability of control channels, low autonomy and high vulnerability to electronic warfare and FPV drones. Comparative analysis has shown the technological and doctrinal lag of Russian ground robotic complexes from Western and Ukrainian platforms.
Theoretical Implications. Consists in expanding scientific ideas about the role of ground robotic complexes in modern combat operations. The work systematizes key tactical and technical and organizational factors that determine the effectiveness of NRC in conditions of high saturation with electronic warfare means. The theoretical limits of the use of ground robotic complexes as an auxiliary, rather than an independent, strike element have been clarified. The conclusions obtained can be used in further military-theoretical and comparative studies of military robotics.
Practical Implications. Lies in the possibility of using the obtained results to assess the real combat effectiveness of ground robotic complexes in modern war conditions. The conclusions of the work can be applied when developing tactical recommendations for the use of ground robotic complexes, planning engineering, reconnaissance and logistics operations, as well as in the process of training military specialists.
Papertype. Conceptual and empirical.
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References
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