Improving the effectiveness of Row-Sampling methods to protect against Row-Hummer attacks
Abstract
Purpose: to analyze the protection of systems against RowHammer attacks based on the row sampling method and to propose its improvement using a more realistic memory model and attack model.
Findings: shortcomings in the representation of memory in protection mechanisms based on row sampling are shown and more correct methods for calculating the sampling threshold are shown. The results are presented on real examples of improving DRAM memory protection.
Practical implications: The formulas found can significantly improve the protection of new types of DRAM memory against Rowhammer attacks.
Value: testing data of new memory chips from several DRAM manufacturers is presented. New types of threshold calculation for protection against RowHammer are also presented.
Future research: this research opens up ways to improve software methods for protection against RowHammer and also suggests the development of technical means for combinations with software solutions.
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References
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Copyright (c) 2024 Valentyn Mazurok, Volodymyr Lutsenko
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